DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, MULTI-NATIONAL DIVISION (BAGHDAD)
CAMP CROPPER, IRAQ
APO AE 09342

AFZA-FA-R-A2 (HST-11A)   April 14, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR FOB COMMANDER, TF-134, APO AE 09342

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS)

1. (U) Since 2001 I have spent the majority of my time conducting Source Operations, Screenings, and Interrogations in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The tools available to Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collectors and Interrogators (hereby referred to as "collectors") have remained constant throughout this time. Collectors rely on questioning techniques, previous intelligence reporting, observation of Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP), and "gut" feeling to determine the credibility of Sources, job applicants, and detainees. The ability of the collector to filter truth from fiction is highly dependent on the individual collectors training and real world experience. As the demand for HUMINT personnel has risen, the standards we use to select applicants to the HUMINT field have dropped, yielding a higher percentage of young and inexperienced personnel. However, even the most experienced and highly trained collector will admit that of the various intelligence models, HUMINT enjoys the lowest accuracy percentage. The reasons for this are simple; fields such as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) rely on technology to acquire the information whereas collectors rely on fallible gut feeling, perception, and the skill of the individual collector.

2. (U) The Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS), while not a perfect technological solution that would completely remove the "human factor", it appears to be an invaluable tool. PCASS is not a system that will remove the need for experienced collectors but rather will enhance their capabilities. Collectors can focus on a couple of key areas for the PCASS relevant questions that are most applicable to the individual being tested. If the PCASS system gives a "red" reading to one of these questions, the collector can focus his efforts on exploitation, and use the traditional skills of a collector to uncover deception or information.

3. (U) The Iraqi Correction Officer (ICO) program appeared to be an excellent testing ground for the PCASS. The two primary concerns from an operational security point of view were:
    a. ICO past or present involvement in militia or insurgent activities.
    b. Willingness to pass information from prisoners within the TIF to persons outside base.

The pool of persons screened included Iraqi's new to the ICO program, not yet working at the TIF; ICO's already employed at the TIF; and Local National Interpreters employed at both the TIF and the ICO Academy. The total number of persons screened was 72. Of the 72 persons screened, 46 were ICO's. Of the 46 ICO's tested, 20 tested red, or 43.4%. Of the 72 persons tested, 26 were Arabic Linguists. Of the 26 linguists tested, 7 tested red, or 26.9%.

4. (U) It is important to understand that each of the individuals tested by PCASS had already been screened and cleared by the HUMINT Support Team (HST). As the Team Lead for the HST responsible for screening the ICO personnel, I am the first to acknowledge there is no absolute method to know for certain whether an individual being screened is hiding his true affiliations or intent. It is a fact that Subjects with past and present affiliation with insurgent and militia groups have successfully passed the screening process and are currently employed in the ICO program. PCASS will assist us in determining who these individuals are. The focus of the HST will now be to conduct targeted re-screenings of all personnel testing red. As the post-PCASS re-screenings take place, HST will track the percentages and provide feedback in order to show the effectiveness of PCASS to identify persons being deceptive.

5. (U) Another anticipated benefit of having the capability provided by the PCASS is the psychological effect it has on the pool of potential applicants to the ICO program. Once this capability is introduced and word spreads of it's use, militia or insurgent related individuals will be less likely to attempt to gain admittance into the ICO program.

6. (U) POC: David Thompson, HST-11A, Camp Cropper, VOIP 242-0554.

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